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TAX EXEMPTIONS AND MEDICAL
CARE FOR INDIGENTS
by A. Kay B. Roska
N the United States the ownership and organizational structure of hospi-
tals falls into different classes. I The government owns and maintains
public hospitals, which primarily serve as teaching institutions and as
providers of medical care for indigents. 2 The private sector operates hospi-
tals both for profit and not for profit. 3 Whereas for-profit hospitals (for-
profits) traditionally benefited investors and depended on earnings and se-
curities as their main sources of capital, 4 nonprofit hospitals, both public and
private, primarily benefited the disenfranchised and depended on charitable
donations and governmental grants as their main sources of capital. 5 Histor-
ically, the private nonprofit hospitals (nonprofits or voluntary hospitals), like
the public hospitals, willingly provided unprofitable services and free, or at
least below-cost, care to the poor.6 Operation for charitable purposes enti-
tled these institutions to tax exemptions at the federal, state, and local
levels .
7
Exemption from federal tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
l. B. GRAY, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 3-11 (1986); see also Richards
& Tucker, Nonprofit Organizations: Businesslike Nonprofit Hospitals Losing Traditional Spe-
cial Treatment, PREVENTIVE L. REP., June 1987, at 3 (classifying hospitals on the basis of
government or private ownership and whether conducted for profit).





7. See generally B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 26-29 (4th
ed. 1983) (discussing the advantages of tax exemption); Bromberg & Teplitzky, Tangling with
Tax Law, HOSPITALS, Mar. 1, 1983, at 69, 70 (itemizing the benefits of federal tax exemption);
Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations: A Perspective, 53
TEMP. L.Q. 291, 313-23 (1980) (examining the eligibility criteria of public service for charita-
ble exemption); Squiers, Corporate Restructing of Tax-Exempt Hospitals: The Bastardization
of the Tax-Exempt Concept, 14 LAW, Ml). & HEALTH CARE 66, 67 (1986) (highlighting the
benefits of federal tax exemption).
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nue Code (Code)8 renders hospitals eligible for many benefits. 9 The exemp-
tion itself protects a nonprofit entity's net earnings, including interest on its
endowments or funded depreciation accounts.' 0 Tax deductions available to
individuals and private corporations for contributions to these charitable in-
stitutions encourage philanthropy."I In addition, private foundations prefer
making grants to exempt organizations because severe restrictions accom-
pany grants to nonexempt organizations.12 Federal tax exemption also qual-
ifies voluntary hospitals for grants from federal, state, and local
governments. 13 Forgiveness of property, sales, and other taxes at the state
and local level frequently requires section 501(c)(3) status. 14 As this partial
list of federal tax-exemption benefits demonstrates, the government indi-
rectly subsidizes private nonprofit hospitals. 15 Private performance of a pub-
lic responsibility, such as provision of uncompensated medical services to
indigents, however, justifies the loss of tax revenues. 16 The activities of char-
itable organizations thus improve society as a whole. 17
Several events have caused the voluntary hospitals to curtail their provi-
sion of charity care.18 The availability of third-party coverage for health-
care costs through Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurance, while initially
decreasing the amount of uncompensated care necessary to treat the sick
poor, heightened the demand for medical care, especially specialty services,
8. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986). Section 501(c)(3) establishes the criteria for qualification as
a tax-exempt organization. Id. At the outset an organization must be "organized and oper-
ated exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes. Id. Charity is one of the exempt purposes
set forth in Code § 501(c)(3). Id. Other qualifications under § 501(c)(3) include the require-
ments that earnings cannot inure to the benefit of private shareholders and that the organiza-
tion cannot be involved in political activities. Id.
9. Bromberg & Teplitzky, supra note 7, at 70; see also B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 26-29
(discussing tax-exemption advantages).
10. Bromberg & Teplitzky, supra note 7, at 70.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see I.R.C. § 170 (1986).
13. Bromberg & Teplitzky, supra note 7, at 70.
14. Id. For example, GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-25 (91A-3605) (Harrison Supp. 1987) auto-
matically exempts § 501(c)(3) organizations "in the same manner and to the same extent as for
federal purposes."
15. Perkins & Dowell, Developments Regarding the Charitable Tax Exemptions for Hospi-
tals, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 472, 473 (1985). Congress extends tax exemptions, deductions,
and exclusions to encourage private investment in certain economic activities. Id.
16. Id. See generally Ginsberg, supra note 7, at 306-09 (examining the doctrinal basis of
real property tax-exemption statutes). Courts justify real property tax exemptions for non-
profit organizations by using a burden and/or benefit theory. Id. at 306-08. The burden the-
ory assumes that private performance of a public responsibility replaces government-funded
programs, thereby decreasing federal expenditures. Id. at 307. Opponents of this approach,
however, believe that the private sector should not provide public services. Id. at 311. Propo-
nents respond that society has chosen to provide the exemptions because it does not believe
that the government should have a monoply on providing for the public good. Id. This argu-
ment is conceptually similar to the benefit theory. Under the benefit theory, the activities of
tax-exempt organizations must contribute to the overall well-being of society, but they need
not replace a traditional governmental function. Id. at 307-08.
17. See sources cited supra note 16.
18. See generally P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE
235-447 (1982) (reviewing events leading to corporate medicine); Richards & Tucker, supra
note 1, at 3-4 (summarizing the events leading to corporate medicine).
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and stimulated the growth of investor-owned hospitals. 19 For-profit institu-
tions met the escalating need for technologically advanced diagnosis and
treatment and attracted the paying patients. 20 Inadequate capital placed the
nonprofits at a competitive disadvantage. 2' Diminished reimbursement
from private and public insurers worsened the nonprofits' unfavorable eco-
nomic situation. 22 Nonprofits thus restructured in an attempt to generate
additional capital resources. 23 This restructuring blurred the distinctions be-
tween the nonprofits and the for-profits. 24 Most notably, the voluntary hos-
pitals limited their accessibility to indigent patients. 25
This Comment addresses the question of whether private nonprofit hospi-
tals that have abandoned their historic mission to serve the sick poor should
continue to qualify for tax exemption. Section I chronicles the change in the
Code's charitable purpose standard for hospitals from "relief of the poor" 26
to "promotion of health."'2 7 Section II discusses the effect of the emergence
of competitive investor-owned hospitals on the structure and function of
nonprofits. Section III examines the likelihood that state courts and/or leg-
islatures will require tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals to care for poor patients.
Section IV analyzes who does, as opposed to who should, provide uncom-
pensated medical diagnosis and treatment for the increasing number of med-
ical indigents. Finally, the Comment recommends a statutorily mandated
charity medical-care program for tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals as an alter-
native to the present law that equates nonprofit form and charitable purpose.
19. See P. STARR, supra note 18, at 290-334.
20. See Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 4.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See P. STARR, supra note 18, at 420-49; see also Keenan, Not-For-Profit Systems Posi-
tion Themselves To Meet Upcoming Challenges, HosPITALS, Sept. 1, 1981, at 77 (describing the
various types of multihospital systems); LaViolette, Nonprofits Setting Up For-Profit Divisions
May Even Sell Stock, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 1982, at 98 (surveying multihospital sys-
tems); Squiers, supra note 7, at 71-73 (examining the parent holding company model and iden-
tifying inconsistencies between it and tax-exempt status).
24. Baldwin, Legislatures, Agencies Debating Whether Not-For-Profit Hospitals Deserve
Their Tax-Exempt Status, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 22, 1987, at 34; Herzlinger &
Krasker, Who Profits From Nonprofits?, HARVARD Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 93; Richards
& Tucker, supra note 1, at 3; Squires, supra note 7, at 72.
25. See sources cited supra note 24. But see Lewin, Eckels & Miller, Setting the Record
Straight. The Provision of Uncompensated Care by Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 318 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1212, 1213 (1988) [hereinafter Lewin]; Relman, Are Voluntary Hospitals Caring for the
Poor?, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1198, 1199 (1988).
26. Treas. Reg. § 39.101(6)-1(b) (1954). This regulation stated that " [corporations or-
ganized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes comprise, in general, organizations
for the relief of the poor." Id. This view of charitable purpose was again expounded in Rev.
Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. See generally B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 53 (reviewing the
historical federal tax-law meaning of charitable purpose).
27. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. This ruling concluded that the promotion of
health in general satisfies the charitable purpose requirement for tax exemption. Id. The
Supreme Court, in effect, upheld this ruling by denying indigent plaintiffs the right to challenge
it in court. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-43 (1975).
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I. FEDERAL TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
A. General Historical Perspective
The exemption of charitable organizations from federal income taxation
as currently provided for in section 501(c)(3) of the Code28 originated con-
ceptually as a part of the Tariff Act of 1894.29 Although the draftsmen of
the Act did not specifically articulate the reasons for establishing this exemp-
tion, the similarity between it and English income tax statutes suggests that
they intended to assure the continuation of a prior comparable practice. 30 In
28. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). Section 501(c)(3) currently states:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur
sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of
athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carry-
ing on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as
otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or in-
tervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
29. Tariff Act, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894): "[N]othing herein contained shall apply
to ... corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable,
religious, or educational purposes." The United States Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895), found the Tariff Act of 1894 unconstitutional for
reasons unrelated to the charitable exemption provision. Congress included a similar exemp-
tion in every income tax act enacted after the ratification of the sixteenth amendment, which
granted Congress the power to tax income. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 49. The Tariff Act of
1913 exempted from the income tax "any corporation or association organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes, no part of the net in-
come of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." Tariff Act, ch.
16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 172 (1913). Subsequent income tax acts expanded the enumeration of
exempt organizations to include entities "organized and operated exclusively ... for the pre-
vention of cruelty to children or animals," Revenue Act, ch. 18, § 231(6), 40 Stat. 1076 (1919),
as well as "any community chest, fund, or foundation," and literary groups, Revenue Act, ch.
136, § 231(6), 42 Stat. 253 (1921). The Revenue Act of 1934 added the requirement that "no
substantial part of the activities [of an exempt organization could involve] . . . carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation." Revenue Act, ch. 277,
§ 101(6), 48 Stat. 700 (1934). The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 did not alter the prior law
concerning tax-exempt organizations. I.R.C. §§ 101, 421 (1939). Eventually Congress en-
acted § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954). Congress
again amplified the listing of tax-exempt organizations to include entities "organized and oper-
ated exclusively for ... testing for public safety ... purposes." Id. In addition, Congress did
not allow tax-exempt organizations to "participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing
or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public
office." Id. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 exempted organizations that "foster national or
international amateur sports competitions (but only if no part of its activities involve the provi-
sion of athletic facilities or equipment)." Tax Reform Act, tit. XIII, § 1313, 90 Stat. 1730
(1976). The 1986 codification of the Internal Revenue Code did not alter § (501)(c)(3). I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (1986). Section 501(c)(3) remained unchanged through 1988 except that the rule
against political campaign activities supporting a candidate was expanded also to apply to
opposing a candidate. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1988). See supra note 28.
30. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 46. Charitable purposes listed in the preamble to the
Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 include:
[S]ome for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance of
sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and
scholars in universities, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways,
churches, seabanks and highways, some for education and preferment of or-
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enacting and perpetuating the charitable tax exemption, however, Congress
did not define the term "charitable. ' 3 1 The commonly accepted usage of
charitable is limited to "relief of the poor." 32 By contrast, the common-law
meaning of charitable, as derived from the common law of charitable trusts,
broadly includes any function promoting the general welfare of society. 33 A
review of the law that became Code section 501(c)(3) reveals that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) interpreted charitable purpose to be synonymous
with relief of the poor. 34 The IRS's view is evident, for example, in the
regulations that interpreted the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 3 5 Congress
incorporated sections 101 and 421 of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code as
section 501 in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, without any substantive
changes. 36 Consequently, the term charitable retained its common meaning
for federal tax purposes. 37 In 1956, however, a federal tax regulation ex-
panded the scope of charitable purpose beyond relief of the poor, 38 thereby
officially recognizing the common-law meaning of charitable.3 9 Purposes
other than relief of poverty that serve the general welfare of society thus may
be charitable in the legal sense.
B. Nonprofit Hospitals as Charitable Institutions
Congress did not enumerate health care as one of the qualifying functions
phans, some for or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction,
some for marriages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young
tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief or re-
demption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants
concerning payments of fifteenths, setting out of soldiers and other taxes.
Id. (quoting preamble to Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 4 (1601)); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 comment a (1935) (referring to the preamble to the
Statute of Uses of 1601 as the basis for the concept of charitable purposes).
31. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 48.
32. Id. at 46; see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 378 (1961)
(defining charitable as "generous in assistance to the poor").
33. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 48; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra
note 30, § 368 (identifying the common element of all charitable purposes as accomplishment
of "objects which are beneficial to the community").
34. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 52.
35. For example, Treas. Reg. § 39.101(6)-1(b) (1952) generally described -[c]orporations
organized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes ... [as] organizations for the relief
of the poor." Id. Such corporations, however, "may receive voluntary contributions from the
persons intended to be relieved" without forfeiting tax-exempt status. Id. (emphasis added).
36. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 53 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
A165 (1954)).
37. Id.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1956). This regulation stated that "the term 'chari-
table' is used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to
be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt
purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of 'charity' as developed by judicial deci-
sions." Id.
39. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 53; see also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157
(D.D.C. 1971) (noting that although the term "charitable" is not defined with particularity in
the Internal Revenue Code or Treasury Regulations, "a 'strong analogy' can be derived from
the general common law of charitable trusts").
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or activities in Code section 501(c)(3). 40 The IRS, however, has granted tax-
exempt status to nonprofit hospitals as charitable institutions. 4, Because the
Code failed to specify what constituted a charitable purpose, the IRS evalu-
ated nonprofit hospitals individually.42 The nonprofit hospitals thus re-
quested some guidelines on qualification as a charitable institution.43 In
Revenue Ruling 56-185 the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service
(Commissioner) set forth four general requirements for tax exemption. 44
Under these criteria the hospital was required: (1) to care for the sick; (2) to
an extent commensurate with its financial ability, to provide free or below-
cost care to those both sick and poor; (3) to permit all qualified physicians to
use its facilities; and (4) not to benefit monetarily any private shareholder or
individual. 45 The second requirement, which technically defined charitable
purpose in the context of health-care providers, was consistent with the his-
torical function of hospitals. 46 Until late in the nineteenth century hospitals
provided custodial care without medical treatment for the poor.47 In addi-
tion, these almshouses depended on voluntary private donations, not govern-
mental funding, for financial support a.4
For approximately thirteen years, the IRS conditioned a nonprofit hospi-
tal's charitable status upon the provision of indigent medical care. 49 This
policy, however, failed to account for the multidimensional transformation
that the hospital industry had undergone. 50 Hospitals evolved from primar-
ily serving the sick poor to serving the whole community.5' Consequently,
paying patients instead of philanthropy became the primary financial re-
40. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954). For the text of the current version of § 501(c)(3), see supra
note 28.
41. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (establishing general charitable exemption require-
ments for hospitals); see also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28-29
(1975) (reviewing the status of nonprofit hospitals under the then current Code). The Supreme
Court acknowledged,
The Code ... accords advantageous treatment to several types of nonprofit cor-
porations, including exemption of their income from taxation .... Nonprofit
hospitals have never received these benefits as a favored general category, but an
individual nonprofit hospital has been able to claim them if it could qualify as a
corporation 'organized and operated exclusively for ... charitable ... purposes'
within the meaning of 501(c)(3) of the Code ....
Id.
42. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 29.
43. Id.
44. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
45. Id. at 203-04.
46. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1975); see also P. STARR, supra note 18, at 150 (noting that voluntary
hospitals, like public hospitals, evolved from almshouses for the medically indigent).
47. P. STARR, supra note 18, at 145, 149, 160.
48. Id.
49. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. This ruling required a nonprofit hospital to "be
operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered
and not exclusively for those who are able and expected to pay." Id. at 203. The Commis-
sioner, however, permitted a nonprofit hospital to satisfy its charitable obligation by furnishing
services at below-cost rates. Id. The 1956 ruling remained the announced policy of the IRS
until the issuance of Revenue Ruling 69-545 in 1969. See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
50. P. STARR, supra note 18, at 147-62.
51. Id. at 159.
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source of health-care facilities.5 2 The advent of Medicaid, Medicare, and
private insurance greatly reduced the number of poor people requiring char-
ity medical services. 53 In addition, many local governments began to pro-
vide indigent medical care through public hospitals. 54
In Revenue Ruling 69-545 the Commissioner promulgated another chari-
table purpose standard for tax-exempt status under Code section 501(c)(3). 55
This ruling modified Revenue Ruling 56-185 by recognizing that provision
of health services is an inherently charitable purpose that is not obviated by
limiting hospital access of the medically indigent. 56 The IRS thus deemed
the promotion of health a per se benefit to the community.5" Revenue Rul-
ing 69-545 contained an example of the kind of nonprofit hospital that would
qualify for tax exemption.58 The IRS essentially required only that the non-
profit hospital provide emergency services to all persons and medical care to
all persons able to pay the costs either directly or indirectly through third
parties. 59
The 1969 revenue ruling interpretation of the term charitable, which is
consistent with a 1956 treasury regulation 60 on Code section 501(c)(3), fol-
lowed the common law of charitable trusts.6' Accordingly, the IRS cited
Scott on Trusts62 and the Restatement of Trusts by Scott 63 as its authority for
a change in position regarding provision of indigent medical care. 64 Some
commentators view the common law of trusts as an inappropriate model for
tax-exemption standards. 65 Whereas the common law characterized trusts
as charitable so that the associated property could be inalienable for an in-
52. Id. at 162.
53. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1975); see also B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 91 (noting the inverse
correlation between the availability of reimbursement programs under Medicare and Medicaid
and the number of patients who lack adequate finances for health services).
54. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 506 F.2d at 1288.
55. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. This ruling stated that "a nonprofit organization
whose purpose and activity are providing hospital care is promoting health and may, therefore,
qualify as organized and operated in furtherance of a charitable purpose." Id. at 118.
56. Id. at 118-19. The 1969 ruling further provided that "Revenue Ruling 56-185 is
hereby modified to remove therefrom the requirements relating to caring for patients without
charge or at rates below cost." Id.
57. Id.; see supra note 55.
58. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
59. Id. at 118.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1956); see supra note 38.
61. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. This ruling noted that "in the general law of
charity, the promotion of health is considered to be a charitable purpose." Id. at 118.
62. 4 SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 368, 372 (3d ed. 1967). Scott provides: "A trust for the
promotion of health, however, is none the less charitable although the benefits are not limited
to the poor. Thus, a trust to establish a hospital for all persons whether rich or poor is charita-
ble." Id. § 372; see also id. § 372 (Supp. 1985) (stating "[i]ndeed a nonprofit hospital is a
charitable institution, even if it requires payment by all of its patients, and does not provide
free or reduced-rate services for those who are unable to pay").
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 368, 372 (1959).
64. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; see supra note 61.
65. See Rose, The Implications of the Charitable Deduction and Exemption Provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code Upon the Service Required of a Voluntary Hospital to Treat the Poor,
4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 183, 184 (1970).
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definite time, contrary to the rule against perpetuities, 66 the IRS granted
charities tax-exempt status because the public benefit justified the loss of rev-
enue.67 The purpose to be achieved in the two situations was different. 68
A criticism of Revenue Ruling 69-545 is that it is contrary to Congress's
intent to benefit the medically indigent.69 First, Congress had passed health-
care legislation to assure service to the sick who cannot pay. 70 The Hill-
Burton Act, 71 which makes federal funds available for construction of gov-
ernmental and nonprofit hospitals, requires that recipients of such public
grant-in-aid programs provide a reasonable volume of uncompensated pa-
tient care. 72 In addition, the federal government subsidizes health care to
the aged and to certain classes of the poor through titles 18 (Medicare) and
19 (Medicaid) of the Social Security Act. 73 Consistency with the congres-
sional purposes inherent in these Acts would limit the charitable tax exemp-
tion to only those institutions that also provide medical care to poor persons
who do not qualify for assistance through either the Medicaid or Medicare
program or who have exhausted their third-party coverage. 74
Second, Congress failed to act positively in regard to the 1969 revenue
ruling.75 The Tax Reform Bill of 1969, as reported by the House Ways and
Means Committee, contained language that would have conformed the Code
to the administrative interpretation of Code section 501(c)(3). 76 The House
recommended a separate tax-exempt status for hospitals in response to testi-
mony on behalf of the American Hospital Association. 77 The testimony
highlighted the hospitals' uncertainty as to the extent to which they must
accept the medically indigent as patients. 78 The American Hospital Associa-
tion took the position that the advancement of health without any qualifica-
tions is charitable. 79 The Senate Finance Committee, however, deleted the
House provision and referred the question raised by the provision to its staff
for consideration in the context of a review of Medicaid and Medicare. 80
Thereafter, the Staff of the Senate Finance Committee strongly recom-
mended revocation of Revenue Ruling 69-545 until Congress could establish
66. Id. Scott observed that [t]he common element [of all charitable trusts] is that the
purposes are of a character sufficiently beneficial to justify permitting property to be devoted
for an indefinite time to their accomplishment .... " 4 Scorr ON TRus'Is § 372 (3d ed. 1967).
67. Rose, supra note 65, at 184.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 183-84, 204.
70. Id.; see statutes cited infra notes 71-73.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982).
72. Id.
73. Id. §§ 1395, 1396 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
74. Rose, supra note 65, at 184, 204.
75. Id. at 205; see sources cited infra notes 76-81.
76. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. ON THE TAX REFORM BILL OF 1969, H.R. Doc.




80. Rose, supra note 65, at 183, 205 (viewing deletion as an indication of disapproval).
But cf Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
vacated, 426 U.S. 26 (1975) (court cautioned "this action or inaction by Congress cannot be
interpreted as disapproving the new ruling").
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guidelines for equating the volume of charitable service to the financial abil-
ity of the hospital. 81 Despite the inconsistency between the 1969 revenue
ruling and the apparent congressional intent at that time, Congress has re-
frained from enacting a statutory definition of the term charitable. 82 Con-
gress has thus implicitly accepted the broader meaning of charitable purpose
as articulated by the IRS in the 1956 regulation 83 and the 1969 revenue
ruling.84
Although Congress failed to take any action on the subject of Revenue
Ruling 69-545, a class of indigents, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization,85 challenged the ruling as contrary to the historical
view that charitable purpose under Code section 501(c)(3) means relief of
the poor. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the IRS from granting exemptions
without an obligation to the medically indigent. The United States Supreme
Court remanded the cause to the district court with instructions to dismiss
the complaint for lack of standing to bring suit because the class of indigents
had not shown a direct causal relationship between their injury, namely the
lack of access to health care, and Revenue Ruling 69-545; furthermore, the
Court said the plaintiffs had not shown that a favorable decision would re-
dress their injury. 86 In regard to the latter finding, the Court concluded that
a hospital might deny access to the poor even if its action could negatively
affect its tax-exempt status.8 7 This decision precluded indigent plaintiffs
from challenging the administrative conception of charitable purpose under
Code section 501(c)(3). 88 Consequently, interpretation of the Code lay ex-
clusively within the discretionary power of the IRS. 89
Later, in Lugo v. Miller,90 a group of low income individuals attempted to
overcome the Supreme Court's standing decision by suing specific tax-
exempt nonprofit hospitals, along with federal Treasury officials, to require
the tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals to accept a reasonable number of medi-
cally indigent patients. The Sixth Circuit, however, refused to address the
merits of the case because it found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. 91 This
deferential approach by the judiciary to administrative discretion thus effec-
tively rendered private citizens powerless to have the courts hear their griev-
ances concerning agency action. 92 The Supreme Court has since confirmed
this position holding that class-action plaintiffs do not have standing to chal-
81. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. OF FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON MEDI-
CARE AND MEDICAID: PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND ALTERNATIVES 58 (Feb. 9, 1970).
82. B. HOPKINS, supra note 7, at 54.
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1956); see supra note 38.
84. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117; see supra note 61.
85. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 26 (1975).
86. Id. at 41-43, 46.
87. Id. at 43.
88. See generally C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 205 (1988) (noting
Supreme Court's deference to IRS's interpretations of the Code); Perkins & Dowell, supra note
15, at 472-76 (discussing Supreme Court's unwillingness to hear challenges to IRS's decisions).
89. See sources cited supra note 88.
90. 640 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1981).
91. Id. at 831.
92. See sources cited supra note 88.
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lenge rules promulgated by the IRS. 93 Tax commentators have expressed
concerns about these decisions in light of the fallibility of the IRS in matters
affecting public policy. 94 They therefore suggest that Congress authorize
third-party lawsuits against the IRS when constitutional guarantees are
abridged. 95
In 1983 the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 83-157 in an attempt to clarify the
prerequisites for charitable tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals. 96 The IRS
illustrated implementation of the ruling by amplifying the hypothetical in
situation 1 of Revenue Ruling 69-545. 9' The nonprofit hospital in both ex-
amples maintained a local board and an open medical staff, and it accepted
paying patients. 98 Unlike the original hypothetical, however, it did not oper-
ate an emergency room because a state planning agency decided such a ser-
vice would unnecessarily duplicate nearby facilities.99 Consequently, the
nonprofit hospital in the latter example did not provide any services without
expectation of compensation. 00 Nevertheless, the Commissioner concluded
that it operated exclusively to benefit the community.' 0' Operation of a full-
time emergency room, open to all, was thus not an essential requirement for
charitable tax-exempt status.10 2 The IRS's interpretation of the term chari-
table allowed tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals to limit further access of the
poor. 103
II. CURRENT ROLE OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS
A. Emergence of For-Profit Hospitals
The recent history of the hospital industry reveals the impetus for the
decline and subsequent resurgence of for-profit hospitals.' 0 4 After World
War 11 the Hill-Burton Act provided federal money to build public and pri-
vate nonprofit hospitals. 10 5 These government grants hastened the growth
93. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984).
94. See generally Simon, Supreme Court Limits Ability of Third Parties to Sue Agencies
such as the IRS, 61 J. TAX'N 400 (1984) (questioning the validity of the IRS's interpretation of
public policy).
95. Id. at 402.
96. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.




101. Id. at 95.
102. Id. Other factors demonstrating that a hospital is operating exclusively to benefit the
community include "a board drawn from the community, an open medical staff policy, treat-
ment of persons paying their bills with the aid of public programs like Medicare and Medicaid,
and the application of any surplus to improving facilities, equipment, patient care, and medical
training, education, and research." Id.
103. Perkins & Dowell, supra note 15, at 474.
104. Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 4; see also Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 24,
at 96 (summarizing the historical events initiating the rapid growth in the hospital industry
from 1977 to 1981); P. STARR, supra note 18, at 235-449 (reviewing and analyzing the emer-
gence of corporate medicine).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1982).
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of nonprofits, thereby heralding the demise of the then-existing for-profits. ' 06
Congress enacted this program to expand the nation's health-care system
and thereby to ensure the medically indigent access to hospitals. 0 7 The rise
of specialty medical training in the late 1940s was another factor in the
growth of nonprofits because most medical schools were affiliated with either
private or public nonprofits.' 08 Consequently, society placed greater confi-
dence in the expertise of the nonprofit hospitals, especially those associated
with medical schools, than in that of the for-profit hospitals.'0 9 Nonprofit
hospitals might have continued to dominate had not the focus of the medical
practice itself changed from patients to finances. I10
The four events that revolutionized medical practice helped cause the shift
in focus.I 1  The first major development was the implementation of aseptic
technique.' 12 Next, the discovery of antibiotics provided a cure for bacterial
diseases. 1 13 Aseptic technique together with antibiotic treatment signifi-
cantly diminished the risk of invasive medical procedures.' '4 Third, devel-
opments in science and technology following World War II led to
technological advances in medicine and to specialty medical practices. 115
Finally, the enactment of the Medicare and Medicaid programs and the es-
tablishment of private insurance schemes removed the cost restraints on the
charges for medical care.' 16 These reimbursement plans stimulated a
heightened demand for medical services.' 17
Nonprofits attempted to meet the escalating need for technologically com-
plex and expensive specialty medical services by borrowing money beyond
private philanthropy for expansion.'1 8 They had, however, limited access to
106. Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 4.
107. Id.
108. Id. To be considered a specialist a physician had to spend one or more additional
years in training before entering private practice. Id. These post-graduate programs "in-
creased the moral authority of nonprofit hospitals" over for-profit hospitals. Id.
109. Id. For-profit hospitals had a dubious reputation because the Flexner report closed
for-profit medical schools. Id. The American Medical Association commissioned the Flexner
report in 1910 in an effort to upgrade medical schools in the United States. P. STARR, supra
note 18, at 118.
110. Id. Prior to the shift in medical practice, a physician served primarily as a counselor
to his patients. Id. Physicians, as well as hospital administrators, focused on good works,
rather than financial compensation. Id.
I 11. Id.; see also P. STARR, supra note 18, at 333-78 (describing the events that changed the
nature of American health care).




116. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 73; see also Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note
24, at 96 (concluding that "[t]he adoption of Medicare and Medicaid changed the industry by
creating a huge class of consumers armed with government-backed health insurance").
117. Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 24, at 96.
118. Id.; see also Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 4-5 (noting the adoption of proper
business procedures by nonprofit hospitals). The adoption of proper business procedures, such
as formal budgeting processes, was "a salutary change." Id. at 5. The correlative change in the
traditional structure of nonprofit hospitals, however, "began the erosion of the moral authority
of nonprofit hospitals." Id. The courts' rejection of the doctrine of charitable immunity for
hospitals became the first indication of diminished public confidence in these institutions. Id.
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capital.' 19 Sensing this market opportunity, private entrepreneurs invested
in for-profit hospitals. 120  For-profit hospitals purchased state-of-the-art
technology for diagnosis and treatment and employed highly qualified physi-
cians to render specialty care. 21 Suddenly, nonprofits were in direct compe-
tition with for-profits.' 22 This circumstance created unique problems for
nonprofits-they are one of the few charitable organizations that experiences
direct competition for resources from a for-profit counterpart. 23
B. Consequences of For-Profit Hospital Competition
Nonprofit hospitals lacked adequate capital to compete effectively with
for-profit hospitals.' 24 In an attempt to improve economic conditions non-
profit hospitals diversified by creating new businesses.'2 5 Some of these busi-
nesses were substantially related to promotion of health and were therefore
exempt from taxation. 126 Others, however, were unrelated to the promotion
of health and were therefore subject to taxation.127 In either case capital for
such subsidiaries came, at least in part, from the tax-exempt earnings of the
nonprofit hospitals. 12 8 Moreover, when the subsidiary itself was also a tax-
exempt organization, it could sell its product or service at a lower cost than a
comparable taxable business.' 2 9 The business community thus claimed that
nonprofit hospitals used their tax-exempt status to gain unfair competitive
advantages. ' 30
119. Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 5; see also McCoy, Health Care and the Tax Law:
Reorganizations, Structural Changes, and Other Contemporary Problems of Tax-Exempt Hospi-
tals, 44 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 58.03(2), at 6 (1986) (for-profit hospitals "can compete
on purely commercial and economic grounds, free of the restrictive rules of IRC section
501(c)(3)," such as no private inurement of net earnings and no private benefit).
120. Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 24, at 96; see also Richards & Tucker, supra note 1,
at 5 (observing that access to equity capital markets gave for-profit hospitals an economic
advantage over nonprofit hospitals).
121. Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 5.
122. Id. at 3, 5.
123. Id. at 3.
124. See sources cited supra note 119.
125. Baldwin, supra note 24, at 34-35, 40; Squiers, supra note 7, at 70-71.
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(l) (1956). This regulation provided:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) although it op-
erates a trade or business as a substantial part of its activities, if the operation of
such trade or business is in furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose or
purposes and if the organization is not organized or operated for the primary
purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business, as defined in section 513.
Id.
127. I.R.C. §§ 511-515 (1954) (covering taxation of unrelated business income). If the
noncharitable purpose of the unrelated trade or business becomes the primary purpose of the
nonprofit hospital, then the government may completely deny tax-exempt status to the hospi-
tal. Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 3033.0221 (1987). The IRS developed these exceptions to
exempt status to prevent tax benefits from flowing to an unrelated trade or business. Squiers,
supra note 7, at 70.
128. Baldwin, supra note 24, at 42.
129. Id.
130. Id.; Tax Status of Nonprofit Ventures Challenged, HosPITALS, Jan. 5, 1987, at 46 (an
interview with John Motley, director of federal legislation for the National Federation of In-
dependent Business, who voiced the business community's concern that tax-exempt organiza-
tions undercut prices, forcing many for-profit hospitals out of business).
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Nonprofit hospitals also pursued more creative options to generate finan-
cial resources.' 3 ' To realize economies of scale, some nonprofits joined to-
gether to form chains. 132 An alternative cost reduction approach involved
participation in partnerships and joint ventures. 133 The most common re-
sponse of voluntary hospitals to competition from investor-owned hospitals,
however, was to reorganize into a multi-entity structure. 134 This adaptation
has been described as the "polycorporate enterprise" model. 135 A tax-
exempt parent holding company containing both for-profit and nonprofit
subsidiaries usually comprised the multi-entity structure. 136 At least one of
the nonprofit subsidiaries was a hospital. 137 Ownership of for-profit corpo-
rations did not affect the federal tax-exempt status of either the parent hold-
ing company or the nonprofit subsidiaries as long as the after-tax profits of
the for-profit corporations supported the nonprofit corporations. 138
The Utah Supreme Court 139 and some commentators 140 have concluded
that these adaptations of nonprofit hospitals to the competitive market abol-
ished the distinctions between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Both types
of hospitals now rely on governmental or private health insurance proceeds
and direct payment for financial survival. 141 This dependence on paying pa-
tients eliminates or, at the very least, significantly restricts provision of un-
compensated care to the medically indigent. 4 2
A controversial study by Regina E. Herzlinger, a professor at Harvard
Business School, and William S. Krasker, vice-president of Salomon Broth-
ers, compared nonprofit and for-profit hospital chains. 143 The study essen-
tially concluded that private nonprofits do not deserve tax-exempt status,
because they do not benefit society to any greater extent than investor-owned
hospitals. 144 Several observations substantiate this conclusion. First, orga-
131. See sources cited supra note 23.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.: see also P. STARR, supra note 18, at 437 (examining the financial benefits of the
multi-entity structure).
135. P. STARR, supra note 18, at 437.
136. Id. Starr reported that "[i]n early 1981 the IRS agreed that a voluntary hospital in
California did not lose its tax-exempt status after undertaking various profit-making ventures,
which included a medical office building, a shopping center, a restaurant, and a contract man-
agement consulting firm." Id.," see also Squiers, supra note 7, at 71-73 (describing parent hold-
ing company model).
137. Squiers, supra note 7, at 71-73.
138. Id.
139. Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). The
Utah Supreme Court concluded that "[fthe emergence of hospital organizations with both for-
profit and nonprofit components has increasingly destroyed the charitable pretentions [sic] of
nonprofit organizations." Id. at 272.
140. Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 6. See generally Herzlinger & Krasker, supra
note 24, at 93 (comparing the social benefits of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals and conclud-
ing that nonprofits do not achieve better social results than for-profits).
141. Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 4; see also Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 24,
at 101 (demonstrating that nonprofit hospitals do not price less aggressively than for-profit
hospitals, and that patient revenues from nonprofits and for-profits are similar).
142. See sources cited supra notes 105-107.




nizational form does not appear to influence the cost of services, as evi-
denced by the fact that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals generate similar
patient revenues. 145 Second, nonprofits have lower earnings, but higher op-
erating costs, than for-profit hospitals.146 As a corollary to this finding, for-
profit hospitals function more efficiently than nonprofit hospitals.147 Finally,
patients with little or no health-insurance coverage have as much access to
for-profit hospitals as to nonprofit hospitals. 4 8 For-profit hospitals thus do
not limit admission only to those patients with adequate to generous insur-
ance coverage. 149
Critics of Herzlinger's and Krasker's study challenged its exclusive focus
on nonprofits associated with multihospital chains.' 50 According to a cri-
tique, prepared for the Catholic Health Association by Bradford H. Gray, a
scholar at the National Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine, at the
time of the study multi-hospital chains represented less than thirty percent
of all nonprofits, while that form dominated the investor-owned sector.' 5 1
The basic criticism is that the chain data does not accurately reflect the func-
tion of nonprofits.152 The authors of the study defend it on the grounds that
economic factors will eventually force all hospitals to unite.153 Irrespective
of the questionable applicability of Herzlinger's and Krasker's findings to
freestanding nonprofits, their study establishes that at least some nonprofits
are functionally indistinguishable from their for-profit counterparts.
One crucial consequence of limited availability of medical care for indi-
gents is "patient dumping."' 154 Patient dumping is a calculated refusal to
initiate critical treatment of an emergency patient or to continue necessary
treatment of a hospital patient when the financial resources of the patient are
inadequate to cover the cost of care.' 5 5 Private hospitals transfer such pa-
tients to public hospitals. 156 In recent years the number of uninsured pa-
tients inappropriately transferred from private to public hospitals has
increased dramatically. 157 Federal, state, and local governments recognize
145. Id. at 101.
146. Id. at 103.
147. Id. The Herzlinger and Krasker study indicated that for-profits "use fewer full-time
employees (or their equivalent) and generate 10% more patient days per bed than do the
nonprofits." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. The authors concluded that affluent patients find for-profit and nonprofit hospitals
equally accessible. Id.
150. Baldwin, supra note 24, at 40 (summarizing the critics' objections to the study con-




154. Dallek & Waxman, "Patient Dumping": A Crisis in Emergency Medical Care for the
Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1413 (1986). See generally Dowell, Indigent Access to
Hospital Emergency Room Services, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 483 (1984) (summarizing state
statutes and case law regarding emergency care, and describing methods to achieve enforce-
ment of emergency care laws).






A federal House and Senate Conference Committee introduced the Con-
solidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985, which addressed the issue of
patient dumping as well as many other issues unrelated to health care.159
The Act required Medicare-participating hospitals to evaluate all emer-
gency-room patients regardless of ability to pay.' 60 In addition, the Act pre-
vented hospitals from transferring a patient with an emergency medical
condition' 6' or in active labor 162 without stabilization or certification that
the medical benefits of an unstabilized transfer outweighed the medical risks
of an unstabilized transfer. 6 3 Congress enacted this proposed legislation.164
Texas has passed an antidumping law 1 65 similar to the federal law, speci-
fying minimum standards that govern patient transfers between hospitals.
The state prohibits the transfer of unstabilized emergency patients, unless a
hospital lacks essential expertise or appropriate equipment for stabiliza-
tion.166 Hospitals can thus transfer emergency patients for medical reasons
only. 16 7 By inference, hospitals may still make an economic decision not to
treat stabilized emergency patients and nonemergency patients.
Because antidumping laws do not assure indigents access to private hospi-
tals for nonemergency medical care, public hospitals must provide a high
proportion of health care to the poor.' 68 Consequently, they serve a lower
proportion of privately insured patients.' 69 In most hospitals the financial
surplus from private insurance covers the cost of care to the uninsured.1
70
When revenues from private insurance are limited, provision of a relatively
large amount of uncompensated care will result in chronic financial difficul-
ties, which in the case of public hospitals can only be rectified by increasing
taxes. 17 This problem raises the question of whether the government
should either increase taxes or require nonprofit hospitals to provide medical
services to nonemergency indigent patients. Considering that tax exemp-
tions are a form of subsidy equivalent to the amount of taxes the nonprofits
would otherwise have paid, 17 2 society is entitled to expect tax-exempt insti-
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1414 (citing H.R. 3128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1867 (1985)).
160. H.R. 3128, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1867(e)(1) (1985).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 1867(e)(2).
163. Id. § 1867(e)(4)(B).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (Supp. V 1987).
165. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4438a (Vernon Supp. 1989).
166. Id. § 1(c).
167. Id.
168. Feder, Hadley & Mullner, Poor People and Poor Hospitals: Implications for Public
Policy, 9 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND LAW 237, 239 (1984).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 247.
171. Id.
172. See Perkins & Dowell, supra note 15, at 473 (noting that tax expenditure budget items
such as tax exemptions "represent the revenue losses attributable to provisions of the federal




tutions to serve public interests.1 73
III. STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR TAX EXEMPTION
A. Relationship Between Federal and State Tax Exemption
The federal tax-exempt status of a nonprofit hospital directly affects its
eligibility for state and local tax exemptions. 174 Federal tax exemption
under Code section 501(c)(3) is a common prerequisite for forgiveness of
various state and local taxes.175 Frequently section 501(c)(3) qualification is
the sole requirement.176 All states at least respectfully consider the IRS defi-
nition of charitable purpose when interpreting their own charitable tax-
exemption statutes. 17 7 Consequently, recognition of promotion of health,
per se, as a charitable purpose under Code section 501(c)(3) negatively af-
fects state and local efforts to ensure care for the medically indigent.
B. State Constitutions and Statutes
State constitutions empower legislatures to create tax exemptions for char-
itable institutions. 178 The constitutions variously describe such tax-exempt
institutions as organized and operated for "charitable purposes,"' 179 "purely
public charity,"18 0 or "exclusively charitable purposes."181 Accordingly,
state statutes contain the same general phrases. 182  Most state statutes
neither enumerate charitable activities' 83 nor establish affirmative obliga-
tions to the poor. 184 Nevertheless, state courts have often interpreted their
constitutional and statutory provisions to require nontaxable hospitals to
173. Id.
174. See generally Bromberg & Teplitzky, supra note 7, at 70 (itemizing the benefits of
federal tax exemption); Squiers, supra note 7, at 67 (discussing the benefits of federal tax
exemption).
175. For example, GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-25 (91A-3605) (Harrison Supp. 1987) exempts
organizations described by IRC §§ 401, 501(c)-(e), 664 (1986) "from taxation for state pur-
poses in the same manner and to the same extent as for federal purposes." See sources cited
supra note 174.
176. See GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-25 (91A-3605) (Harrison Supp. 1987).
177. See sources cited supra note 174.
178. See selected constitutional provisions cited infra notes 179-181.
179. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § I (providing "property used for ... charitable purposes ...
may by law be exempted from taxation").
180. GA. CONST. art. VII, § 1; MINN. CONST. art. 10, § 1; PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; TEX.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (providing "the legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation
... institutions of purely public charity").
181. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 5; FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6; UTAH
CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (providing "lots with buildings thereon used exclusively for either reli-
gious worship or charitable purposes ... shall be exempt from taxation").
182. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.18(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982). The statute provides that
"[a] charitable organization must be organized exclusively to perform ... charitable ... pur-
poses ...." Id.
183. Ginsberg, supra note 7, at 315. But cf ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-271(4) (Supp.
1979) (exempting hospitals and other charitable institutions).
184. Ginsberg, supra note 7, at 315. But cf ALA. CODE § 40-9-1 (Supp. 1988) (exempting
"[a]ll property . . . used exclusively for hospital purposes . . . where such hospitals maintain
wards for charity patients or give treatment to such patients; provided, that the treatment of
charity patients constitutes at least 15 percent of the business of such hospitals .... "); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 27-31-1 (Supp. 1987) (exempting "[a]ll property . . . which is used for hospital
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care for the medically indigent. 18 5
C. State Court Decisions
In 1985 the Utah Supreme Court in Utah County v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. 186 created a stringent test that nonprofit hospitals in the state
must pass to gain exemptions from county property taxes. 187 The test deter-
mines whether a particular institution actually uses its property exclusively
for charitable purposes as required under the Utah Constitution.'88 The test
consists of several elements:
(1) whether the governing instrument of the hospital identifies gratui-
tous service to needy patients as the purpose;
(2) whether philanthropic contributions substantially support the
hospital;
(3) whether the hospital requires any financial reciprocation from char-
ity patients;
(4) whether the gross income, including philanthropic contributions and
patient revenues, exceeds operational and long-term maintenance expenses;
(5) whether the hospital freely or selectively extends gratuitous service
and, if charity care is limited, whether the selection criteria further the hos-
pital's charitable objectives;
(6) whether private parties receive any form of financial benefit during
operation or upon dissolution of the hospital; and
(7) whether commercial functions are secondary to charitable ones.'189
The Minnesota Supreme Court first outlined these criteria in North Star
Research Institute v. County of Hennepin 190 as guidelines for case-by-case
purposes ...and which maintains one or more charity wards that are for charity patients
185. See generally Perkins & Dowell, supra note 15, at 476-78 (reviewing state court deci-
sions); Perkins & Dowell, Tax Exemptions for Health Care Facilities. Charity Care Enters the
Picture, 22 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 247, 247-49 (1988) (reviewing more recent state court
decisions).
186. 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). The Utah State Tax Commission overruled the Utah
County Board of Equalization's decision not to grant charitable property tax exemptions to
Utah Valley Hospital, owned and operated by Intermountain Health Care (IHC), and Ameri-
can Fork Hospital, leased and operated by IHC. Utah County sought a review of the Commis-
sion's ruling. Both hospitals, as well as IHC, were nonprofit corporations. The record,
however, showed neither "nonreciprocal provision of services" nor "alleviation of a govern-
ment burden" under the court's test of charitableness. Id. at 278; see infra text accompanying
note 189. The hospitals' failure to demonstrate "any substantial imbalance between the value
of the services [they] provide[] and the payments [they] receive[] apart from any gifts, dona-
tions, or endowments" led the court to conclude that neither hospital used its property exclu-
sively for charitable purposes under the Utah Constitution. 709 P.2d at 274. The court,
therefore, denied both hospitals charitable property tax exemptions. Id. at 278.
187. 709 P.2d at 269.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 269-70.
190. 306 Minn. 1, 6, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 (1975). More recently, the Minnesota Supreme
Court applied the North Star criteria to deny a health maintenance organization exemption
from sales and use taxation. Share v. Commissioner, 363 N.W.2d 47, 50-51 (Minn. 1985).
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analysis of whether an institution qualifies for a charitable tax exemption. 19 1
Both supreme courts stressed that compliance with all factors was not essen-
tial to merit tax-exempt status.192
Factors two through five represent three different criteria for evaluating a
nonprofit's provision of medical services to indigent patients., 9 3 Factor two
indirectly indicates the extent to which patient revenues cover the institu-
tion's operational expenses; if patient revenues are the primary source of fi-
nancial support, then the charitableness of the nonprofit is questionable. 19
4
Factor three addresses remuneration for services rendered; if the nonprofit
expects payment, then it is not generously providing care for the sick
poor. 195 Factors four and five concern whether the nonprofit is functioning
as a for-profit business; if the nonprofit generates a surplus and limits access
of the poor, then it is neither relieving a governmental burden nor benefiting
the community. 196 The essential element of charity, therefore, is "gift to the
community," which requires performance of a public responsibility or provi-
sion of services without reciprocal payment. 19 7 This holding negates two
common conceptions: (1) the equivalence of nonprofit status and charitable
purpose, and (2) the direct relationship between federal tax-exempt status
and state tax-exempt status. 98
Although no other state court has enunciated particularized preconditions
for charitable tax exemptions, most case-by-case rulings are consistent with
the principles governing the Utah decision. 199 For example, the Colorado
Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the state constitutional mandate
that exempt property be used exclusively for charitable purposes as requiring
generosity of services to needy persons. 200 Such uncompensated care of the
191. 306 Minn. at 6, 236 N.W.2d at 757; accord Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at
270.
192. 306 Minn. at 6, 236 N.W.2d at 757. In Intermountain Health Care the Utah Supreme
Court explicitly stated that "each case must be decided on its own facts, and the foregoing
factors are not all of equal significance, nor must an institution always qualify under all [fac-
tors] before it will be eligible for an exemption." 709 P.2d at 270.
193. 709 P.2d at 272-76. For an analysis of the Intermountain Health Care decision, see
McCoy, supra note 119, at 7-10, and C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 88, at 197-200.
194. See case and sources cited supra note 193.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. In a later case the Utah Supreme Court held that "provision of low-cost housing
to low-income handicapped and elderly people in a proper environment constitutes charity."
Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization, 714 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1986). The court based
its holding on a social-benefit rationale, acknowledging that purposes other than "the mere
relief of the destitute or the giving of alms" may qualify as exclusively charitable. Id.
198. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 278.
199. See generally Perkins & Dowell, supra note 15, at 476-78 (reviewing state court deci-
sions); Perkins & Dowell, supra note 185, at 247-49 (reviewing more recent state court
decisions).
200. West Brandt Found., Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564, 569-70 (Colo. 1982); United Pres-
byterian Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 167 Colo. 485, 448 P.2d 967, 971 (1968). The
court in United Presbyterian Association quoted with approval the definition of charitable pur-
pose articulated by Mr. Justice Gray in Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867):
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied
consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of per-
sons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or
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medically indigent relieves a governmental burden and benefits society by
obviating the necessity of increased taxes to support state welfare pro-
grams. 20  Florida,20 2 Illinois,20 3 Missouri, 20 4 and West Virginia20 5 courts
have reached similar conclusions regarding provision of unobstructed char-
ity. State courts, however, have held that mandatory payment from finan-
cially competent patients does not defeat a charitable tax exemption.2 0 6 Fees
only become dispositive of state tax-exempt status when the hospital expects
all patients to pay for care and bases the quality of services rendered upon
religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint, by assist-
ing them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public
buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of government.
Id. at 971-72 (emphasis added by Colorado Supreme Court).
201. West Brandt Found., 652 P.2d at 568-69.
202. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965) (acknowledging that charity denotes "gifts to the poor or positive steps taken to
relieve distress and suffering of those unable to help themselves").
203. Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 I1. 2d 149, 157, 233 N.E.2d 537, 541-42
(1986). To qualify for a charitable tax exemption, an institution must "not appear to place
obstacles of any character in the way of those who need and would avail themselves of the
charitable benefits it dispenses." Id.; accord Highland Park Hosp. v. State Dep't Revenue, 155
Ill. App. 3d 272, 507 N.E.2d 1331, 1336 (1987) (following the criteria for determining
whether an organization qualifies for a charitable tax exemption set out in Methodist Old Peo-
ples Home, 39 Il1. 2d at 157, 233 N.E.2d at 541-42).
204. Community Memorial Hosp. v. City of Moberly, 422 S.W.2d 290, 295-96 (Mo. 1967).
The court quoted with approval 15 Am. JUR. 2d Charities § 148 (currently § 183 (1976)):
A hospital cannot ... without losing its character as a public charitable hospital,
receive pay patients to such an extent as will exhaust its accommodations and
prevent its receiving and extending hospital service to the usual and ordinary
number of indigent patients applying for admission under proper rules and regu-
lations adopted by the authority managing and controlling the operation of such
hospitals, since a hospital purchased with funds donated for the purpose of es-
tablishing and operating a public charitable hospital must be conducted as such
a hospital.
Id. The Missouri Supreme Court in Jackson County v. State Tax Comm'n, 521 S.W.2d 378
(Mo. 1975), relying on Community Memorial Hospital, concluded that "providing of hospital
facilities for the sick in a nonprofit manner rises to a charitable purpose tax-exempt status if
the same is available to both rich and poor." Id. at 383.
205. State ex rel. Cook v. Rose, 299 S.E.2d 3, 6 (W. Va. 1982). The court first established
the rule that taxation is the norm, whereas tax exemptions are the exception. Id. Courts thus
strictly construe tax exemptions. Id. The court then enumerated several factors to consider
when determining charitable tax exemption status. Id. The factors include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(1) [t]he purpose of the organization as set forth in its charter, articles of incor-
poration or partnership;
(2) [t]he activities or services being offered on the premises of the property;
(3) [t]he availability to the general public of the services or activities offered by
the organization . . . in the particular property being considered;
(4) [t]he presence or absence of rental income obtained from private organiza-
tions or persons for use of the property;
(5) [w]here an exemption for charitable uses is claimed the amount of fees or
other charges instituted for participation in the services or activities offered; and
(6) [t]he sources of income used to operate and maintain the property on a
"nonprofit" basis [and to] share deficits caused by expenses exceed[ing] receipts.
Id. (citing GUIDE FOR AssFSSORs 8-13 to 8-15 (1979)). The court acknowledged that treat-
ment of indigent patients is "probably the single most important element necessary for a finding
that a hospital is charitable under West Virginia property tax law." Id. at 7 (quoting GUIDE
FOR ASSESSORs, 8-83 to 8-85 (1980) (emphasis added by court)).
206. See cases cited supra notes 200-205.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the amount the patient is able to pay."' 7
By contrast, Texas courts currently do not equate charity with relief of the
poor. In City of Houston v. Scottish Rite Benevolent Association 208 the Texas
Supreme Court initially defined an "institution of purely public charity" as
one that "[makes] no gain or profit; ... [accomplishes] ends wholly benevo-
lent; and ... [benefits] persons, indefinite in numbers and in personalities, by
preventing them, through absolute gratuity, from becoming burdens to soci-
ety and to the state." °2 0 9 In a later decision the supreme court held, however,
that absolute gratuity is not an essential element of charity210 and thus ac-
cepted the federal government's position that charity is more than relief of
the poor.2 11 Thereafter, a Texas court of appeals permitted a nonprofit
whose only source of revenue was paying patients to retain its charitable tax
exemption because it treated some indigents. 2 12 Although the primary pur-
pose of the nonprofit appeared to be provision of compensated services, the
court held that it satisfied the ultimate requirement of a material assumption
of a potential public obligation or duty. 213 In accordance with the rationale
and decisions in these cases another appellate court interpreted benevolent to
include any act designed to promote the welfare of others, thereby giving it a
broader meaning than charity. 2t 4 This decision further relaxed the defini-
207. Id. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court held that "where material reciprocity
between alleged recipients and their alleged donor exists-then charity does not." West
Brandt Found., Inc. v. Carper, 652 P.2d 564, 568 (Colo. 1982). Similarly, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the fee structure of a charitable institution cannot relate to "the bargaining of
the commercial marketplace." Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149, 157,
233 N.E.2d 537, 542 (1968).
208. 111 Tex. 191, 230 S.W. 978 (1921).
209. Id. at 198, 230 S.W. at 981.
210. City of McAllen v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y, 530 S.W.2d 806,
809-10 (Tex. 1976). The court in Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society noted that
other "courts have defined charity to be something more than mere alms-giving or the relief of
poverty and distress." Id. The court held that the determination of tax-exempt status should
be based upon "an evaluation of the total operation of the institution engaged in humanitarian
activities whose services are rendered at cost or less and which are maintained to care for the
physical and mental well-being of the recipients." Id. at 810 (emphasis added). The court thus
expected that a charitable institution would not derive a profit from its services. Id. The court
further stated that the institution must perform a government function. Id. This holding has
been followed more recently by the courts in Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Leaves, Inc.,
742 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied), and Lamb County Appraisal
Dist. v. South Plains Hosp.-Clinic, Inc., 688 S.W.2d 896, 905-06 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
211. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
212. Lamb County Appraisal Dist., 688 S.W.2d at 905.
213. Id. at 906. The court quoted the opinion of the Texas Supreme Court in Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Society, 530 S.W.2d at 810, as controlling precedent:
[I]t is well settled that the fact that paying patients predominate over those unable
to pay does not detract from the charitable nature of the service rendered ....
Reliance upon percentages of paying patients versus non-paying patients, however,
should not be the controlling factor. With the advent of present day social secur-
ity and welfare programs, the traditional concept of charity, involving the exten-
sion of free services to the poor and alms-giving, will be rarely found since wide
ranging assistance is available to the poor under such programs.
Id. at 905-06 (emphasis added by appellate court).
214. Needville Indep. School Dist. v. S.P.J.S.T. Rest Home, 566 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
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tion in Scottish Rite Benevolent Association2 1 5 of purely public charity. In
Texas, as in some other states,2 16 charitable tax-exempt status for nonprofits,
therefore, is not contingent upon provision of free or even reduced-rate med-
ical services.
D. State Legislative Activity
The loss in tax revenue, the steady increase in the number of indigent
patients and medically needy patients, and the rise in the cost of health care
have collectively prompted most, if not all, state legislatures to address the
problem of health care for those patients who are unable to pay for medical
services.2 17 A 1988 survey of state legislatures reveals that at least nine
states,2 18 including Texas, are reevaluating charitable tax exemptions for
nonprofit hospitals, and some are even considering setting minimum-care
requirements for indigent patients and medically needy patients. 21 9 Texas
organized a state task force to study this problem and ultimately to recom-
mend the threshold level of charity care that nonprofit hospitals must pro-
vide in exchange for tax exemption. 22 0  If such legislation is enacted, the
state comptroller as well as the courts would have a legal duty to require all
nonprofit hospitals to accept their proportionate share of indigent and medi-
cally needy patients.
IV. PROPOSAL
The present health-care system has created a serious social problem. 22 1
As for-profit hospitals began to capture the medical market,2 22 nonprofit
215. 111 Tex. at 198, 230 S.W. at 981; see supra text accompanying notes 208-209.
216. See West Allegheny Hosp. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Rev., 455
A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1982). The West Allegheny court reversed a lower court holding that the
hospital was not entitled to a property tax exemption because the hospital recovered approxi-
mately 97% of in-patient care charges and 80% of out-patient care charges. 63 Pa. Commw.
555, 439 A.2d 1293, 1296 (1981). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "the word 'char-
ity' as used by the Legislature does not contemplate the requirement that there be only a
nominal charge to beneficiaries." 455 A.2d at 1173. The dissent presents a good counter
analysis. Id. at 1173-75.
217. Special Report, Indigent Care-Where Do We Go From Here?, FED. AM. HEALTH
Sys. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 22, 22-26 [hereinafter Special Report, Indigent Care].
218. Special Report, The 1988 State-by-State Legislative Survey, FED. AM. HEALTH SYS.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 28, 28-41 [hereinafter Special Report, Survey].
219. Id.
220. Telephone interview with Edward Hopkins, member of the Texas Attorney General's
Region V Committee for the Special Task Force to Study Not-For-Profit Hospitals and Un-
sponsored Charity Care (Sept. 23, 1988). With the change in personnel in the Attorney Gen-
eral's office, the status of this task force is uncertain.
221. Special Report, Indigent Care, supra note 217, at 24; see also Baldwin, IOM Report
Urges Government to Take the Lead, but Quick Action Isn't Likely, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
July 4, 1986, at 58, 58 (reviewing indigent care crisis in 1986).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 18, 25. Although the free market should operate
to improve the efficiency, accessibility, and quality of health care, at least one commentator
suggests that its overall effect has been detrimental because of several anomalies of the medical
market. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 N. ENO3. J. MED. 963, 963, 966-
67 (1981). First, government-funding of health care and health-related research fosters the
view that the public is entitled to medical services as a fundamental right. Id. Second, public
or private insurance covers a large fraction of the cost of most medical services, thereby reliev-
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hospitals, to compete, modified their financial structure by manipulating
privileges associated with section 501(c)(3) status 223 and changed their focus
from caring for the sick poor to attracting paying patients. 224 That transfor-
ing individuals of direct financial responsibility for their health care. Id. This compensation
system creates consumers who are insensitive to price and therefore interferes with the normal
economic operation of supply and demand. Id. Finally, patients, unlike consumers of other
products or services, usually do not determine their medical needs. Id. Physicians, in effect,
make such decisions for patients because patients generally do not have adequate knowledge to
evaluate health-care options in a meaningful manner. Id. The public thus entrusts physicians
and hospitals with its health. Id. Despite this trust relationship, the private health-care indus-
try encourages overuse and misuse of its services. Id.
223. Many nonprofits responded to the financial pressures of the marketplace by restruc-
turing into multi-entity forms. Keenan, supra note 23, at 77; LaViolette, supra note 23, at 98;
McCoy, supra note 119, at 11; Squiers, supra note 7, at 71-72. The nonprofit hospital and
other nonprofit businesses as well as for-profit businesses become subsidiaries of the parent.
See supra text accompanying notes 134-138. Examination of this multi-entity enterprise
reveals the advantages. Squiers, supra note 7, at 71-73. First, the proprietary subsidiaries pay
all or the appropriate percentage of their profits as dividends to the parent, which then trans-
fers the gain to the nonprofit hospital subsidiary, thereby increasing the hospital's revenues
without subjecting it to tax consequences. Id. Normally, the IRS requires a tax-exempt non-
profit hospital to pay taxes on income derived from any ancillary activity that does not pro-
mote the institution's charitable purpose. Id.; see I.R.C. §§ 511-515 (1954) (provides for
taxation of unrelated business income). In addition, if the noncharitable purpose of the ancil-
lary activity becomes the primary purpose of the nonprofit hospital, then the hospital loses its
tax-exempt status. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e)(l) (1956) (defining operation of trade or
business). By establishing parent holding companies, nonprofit hospitals circumvent such stat-
utory limitations. Squiers, supra note 7, at 72.
The parent holding company also provides opportunities for private individuals associated
with the nonprofit hospital to benefit financially without violating the noninurement clause of
Code § 501(c)(3). Id. at 72-73. For example, members of the hospital's medical staff may
invest privately in the affiliated for-profit corporations and receive dividends in return. Id. In
addition, the for-profit alternative provider subsidiaries such as outpatient renal dialysis, reha-
bilitation, or ambulatory surgery services may also employ members of the hospital's medical
staff. Id. at 71, 73. Because salaries for such corporations are not statutorily regulated, com-
pensation may exceed the value of the employee's actual contribution to the outpatient service.
Id. Consequently, physicians at nonprofit hospitals may now benefit monetarily from the fi-
nancial success of the multi-entity enterprise and thus indirectly the hospital. A nonprofit
hospital as a subsidiary to a nonprofit parent holding company or as a member of another
multi-entity form can enjoy both the benefits of tax exemption and the advantages of a proprie-
tary business.
224. Kennedy, The Proprietarization of Voluntary Hospitals, 61 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED.
81, 81-82 (1985); Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 3-6; Squiers, supra note 7, at 71-73.
Several studies based on national averages indicate for-profits and nonprofits treat similar
numbers of medically indigent patients. Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 24, at 101-03;
Relman, supra note 25, at 1199. Critics of these studies claim that national averages are statis-
tically inaccurate because they do not account for the considerable variations in the percentage
of state populations that are medically indigent. Lewin, supra note 25, at 1213; Relman, supra
note 25, at 1199. In addition, the extent of each state's dependence on private hospitals for
charity care varies. Id. Volunteer Trustees for Not-for-Profit Hospitals, therefore, commis-
sioned a study to examine the differences in amounts of uncompensated medical care among
hospitals in five states: California, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Lewin,
supra note 25, at 1213. These states satisfied three criteria: (1) in each state for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals competed directly with each other; (2) in terms of size and geographical
location the states represented a cross-section of the United States; and (3) each state collected
data suitable for analyzing the comparative degree to which the voluntary hospitals and inves-
tor-owned hospitals relieved the charity care burdens. Id. This study demonstrated that non-
profit hospitals provided 50% to 90% more free care than for-profit hospitals in four of the five
states surveyed. Id. at 1214. In California, where charity care is publicly financed, all private
institutions contributed equally. Id. Low Medicaid reimbursement, as in Florida and Tennes-
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mation of the nonprofits, coupled with a general reduction in federal finan-
cial resources to supplement health-care costs, 225 has resulted in a decline in
the availability of adequate medical services for indigent patients. 2 2 6 Both
Congress and the Supreme Court have implicitly sanctioned this decline, the
former by accepting the IRS's broad interpretation of the Code's charitable
purpose standard, 22 7 and the latter by refusing to hear challenges to that
interpretation. 228
Society has begun to question the tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospi-
tals. 2 2 9 Its primary concern is whether nonprofits provide appropriate levels
of uncompensated and/or below-cost medical care. 230 Taxpayers, who are
indirect shareholders in tax-exempt nonprofits, arguably expect such institu-
tions to treat a proportionate share of the sick poor.23' For-profit hospitals
do not have the same obligation to society. The extent to which for-profits
provide charity care, therefore, is not relevant to the determination of how
much charity care nonprofits should provide. As public hospitals cannot
service all of the medically indigent patients, 232 private nonprofit hospitals
must also care for the sick poor.
State legislatures should rise to the challenge and accept the responsibility
of statutorily establishing affirmative obligations to the sick poor as a prereq-
uisite to charitable tax-exempt status. Each state legislature should deter-
mine the extent of its indigent medical care problem and, accordingly, set a
minimum level of charity medical services to be provided by tax-exempt
see, negatively affected voluntary assumption of charity care by investor-owned hospitals. Id.
A similar situation exists in Texas. Kennedy, supra, at 86.
The overall and individual state evaluations reveal that the structure of a study predeter-
mines its results. This aspect of selective statistical evaluation diminishes its reliability. Such
studies thus do not facilitate solving the problem of who should care for medically indigent
patients.
225. Kennedy, supra note 224, at 86; Squiers, supra note 7, at 66. For many years Medi-
care reimbursement was based on the actual cost of hospital services to charity patients, which
was offset by some types of hospital income. Id. Today hospitals receive a fixed amount for a
specific treatment regardless of the actual cost. Id. Because such payments can be no greater
than they would have been under the original system, hospital remuneration has not necessar-
ily improved. Id. A progressive trend toward less governmental support, however, preceded
the change in the Medicare reimbursement system. Id. For example, the percentage of hospi-
tal charges covered by Medicare decreased from 75% in 1974 to only 68.7% in 1982. Id.
Similarly, private insurance tightened controls on reimbursement. Id.; Kennedy, supra note
224, at 86. Consequently, hospitals could no longer cover their unreimbursed costs on Medi-
care patients with revenues from privately insured or self-insured patients. Lewin, supra note
25, at 1212.
226. Kennedy, supra note 224, at 81-82; Richards & Tucker, supra note 1, at 3-6; Squiers,
supra note 7, at 71-73.
227. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
229. Baldwin, supra note 24, at 34-35; Special Report, Indigent Care, supra note 217, at 22;
Special Report, Survey, supra note 218, at 28-41.
230. Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 24, at 93; Lewin, supra note 25, at 1212-13; Relman,
supra note 25, at 1198-99.
231. See Relman, supra note 25, at 1199. Relman believes that the preferential tax treat-
ment of voluntary hospitals is only justified if these institutions follow their historic mission to
care for the medically needy. Id.




nonprofit hospitals. This level could be phrased as a percentage of total pa-
tient care. Because in-patient services are more costly to a provider than
out-patient services, a statute should stipulate that no more than half of a
nonprofit hospital's charity care may be related to out-patient services with-
out approval of a state's taxing entity. A statute should also provide for
transfers of nonemergency, stable emergency, or long-term indigent patients
from a hospital handling a significant number of indigent cases to one not
receiving sufficient requests for charity medical services. Such a provision
would equalize indigents' access to health care by making tax-exempt non-
profits located in affluent areas available to needy patients. If a tax-exempt
nonprofit cannot satisfy the charity care requirement after a good faith effort
to comply, then the institution should be able to request permission from a
state's taxing entity to conduct an alternative community service such as a
program for acquired immune deficiency disease syndrome (AIDS) victims
or substance abuse sufferers. Otherwise, a nonprofit hospital not in complete
compliance with such a statute would be granted only a partial tax exemp-
tion related to its actual provision of charity care, or denied tax-exempt sta-
tus altogether, depending on the surrounding circumstances. A state's
taxing entity, however, should have the authority to recognize an exception
to this provision when (1) a nonprofit is financially incompetent to satisfy the
charity care requirement, (2) a denial of tax-exempt status would cause
bankruptcy, and (3) the community needs the institution.
Although a for-profit hospital would not have a legal responsibility to care
for medical indigents, a statute should include a tax-incentive program to
encourage such community service. This program should adjust a for-
profit's tax rate or provide a tax credit according to the degree to which the
institution relieves the state's indigent medical-care burden. This tax advan-
tage would be an option to treating the charity service amount as a tax-
deductible business loss. 233 To function as an incentive to care for the sick
poor, the charity service advantage must therefore be a more favorable tax
treatment than the business loss deduction. 234
Opponents of mandatory charity medical care by nonprofits might argue
that it is inappropriate to place the burden of public health exclusively on
nonprofit as well as public hospitals and indirectly their paying patients.
Rather, they might propose national health insurance, because it directly
distributes the public health burden among all taxpayers, and it guarantees
universal coverage, uniform fees, and comprehensive services. 235 Society,
however, has given physicians and hospitals a monopoly on health care,
thereby creating a trust relationship between physicians/hospitals and soci-
ety. Requiring government-subsidized hospitals to relieve public health bur-
dens is therefore clearly appropriate and reasonable. In addition, state-
233. I.R.C. § 166(a) (1986).
234. "A credit is more advantageous to the taxpayer than a deduction because it reduces
tax liability dollar-for-dollar, whereas a deduction reduces only taxable income with a corre-
sponding but smaller reduction in tax liability." J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 962 (6th ed. 1987).
235. See Kennedy, supra note 224, at 88-89.
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regulated hospital charity is likely to be a more economical and beneficial
solution than national health insurance. Under the proposed statutory
scheme hospitals would keep the cost of health care low for financial reasons
and the quality of health care high for public-relations reasons. By contrast,
the administrative costs of a national program would offset, at least partially,
any reduction in medical service fees, and health care providers reimbursed
by national health insurance would probably be less sensitive to public opin-
ion and thus less concerned about the quality of their services.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States currently faces an indigent medical-care crisis. Factors
contributing to this problem include: (1) increase in the number of medical
indigents, (2) rise in health care costs, (3) change in the focus of nonprofit
hospitals from patient welfare to financial success, (4) decrease in the
amount of charity medical care provided by nonprofit hospitals, and (5)
elimination of the charity medical-care requirement for federal tax-exempt
status under Code section 501(c)(3). Many state courts have sought to rec-
tify the indigent health-care crisis by construing their constitutions and stat-
utes to require tax-exempt nonprofit hospitals to serve the medical needs of
the sick poor. This approach, however, results in inconsistent application of
the law. State legislatures, therefore, should amend their charitable tax-
exempt statutes, legally obligating a nonprofit hospital to treat its propor-
tionate share of the indigent patient population. This Comment proposes
guidelines for such a statutory amendment.
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